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Interviewer:
‘It seems that for people themselves it’s not just about responding when damage has been 
done in terms of, you know, psychosocial services. It’s actually about preventing that damage 
from happening in the first place.’
Interviewee:
‘Well, that’s a political agenda and one that I’m probably not best to go into with you here.’
From interview with bilateral donor agency officer, Jerusalem, August 2009
‘We focus on doing things right, rather than doing the right things.’
International aid worker, Jerusalem, August 2009
‘There is nowhere safe for us. The soldiers go everywhere, even into our houses.’
Eleven year old boy, al-Askar refugee camp, Nablus, July 2009
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 Executive summary
Between December 2008 and January 2009 around 350 Palestinian children were killed 
and approximately 10,500 displaced during Israel’s bombardment of Gaza (DCI/PS, 2009). 
For children living in the occupied territories of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem 
the extreme effects of political violence, such as witnessed at that time, are a tragically 
familiar feature of everyday life. Indeed, this violence has shaped the settings in which 
successive generations of children have grown up. Within this volatile setting numerous 
UN and international agencies have worked for many years with the aim of protecting 
children and realising their basic rights. Yet, the limits of their capacity to fulfil this aim 
have been made obvious time and again.
The failure of the donors, UN agencies and International NGOs (INGOs) to ensure proper 
protection of Palestinian children from the political violence of the Israeli government 
and settlers may be attributed to an array of factors that are conceptual, institutional and 
political in nature. 
At the conceptual level two interrelated problems are evident. The first concerns the 
characterisation of the setting of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) as one of 
humanitarian crisis arising due to conflict between two more or less equivalent parties. 
This does not reflect realities on the ground where occupation and the systematic 
appropriation of Palestinian land and resources by Israel over several decades have (a) 
given rise to a range of specific threats to children and (b) created particular challenges 
for agencies seeking to address these threats. It would be more accurate to frame the 
oPt as a human rights and protection crisis in which efforts to deliver aid and support 
must be accompanied by efforts at the political level. The second conceptual error 
relates to the emerging globalised approach to child protection. In recent years agencies 
such as UNICEF and Save the Children have been central to the pursuit of a standard 
understanding and set of tools to address the threat to children in settings of humanitarian 
crisis. The practice of standardisation is inherently problematic since it downplays the 
importance of contextual understanding and the need to adapt protection strategies to 
particular political, cultural and socio-economic settings. Beyond that, the dominant 
role played by experts from the fields of mental health and social work is reinforcing the 
tendency towards a universalised, technocratic approach focused as much, if not more, 
on remedy as on prevention. While both of these disciplines have a vital contribution 
to make, their conventional lack of engagement with structural and cultural issues and 
their tendency to pursue an invidualistic and depoliticised approach are at odds with 
the demands of a human rights and protection crisis as found in the oPt. Furthermore, 
the resulting approach does not meet the values, concerns and aspirations of many 
Palestinians surrounding the protection of children. 
The conceptual problems are reinforced by the institutional architecture of child 
protection in the oPt. Hierarchical relations between UN agencies, INGOs and local 
partner NGOs – evident in many humanitarian and development settings – have been 
reinforced by introduction of the cluster system. In particular, the positioning of UNICEF 
as chair of the Child Protection Working Group (CPWG) enables the problematic global 
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approach to child protection to play a dominant role in framing efforts across the sector. 
At the same time, the perspectives on child protection of local organisations and the 
Palestinian population more widely remain marginal. 
Ultimately, it is political factors that weigh most heavily upon the capacity of UN and 
international organisations to develop effective child protection strategies that are 
preventative, and not just ameliorative, in nature. The lack of political will to address 
Israel’s violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human 
Rights Law (IHRL), including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), 
is abundantly evident on the ground. Western donor governments – including the EU – 
generally choose not to challenge Israel on practices that clearly put the lives of Palestinian 
children at risk, preferring to support ad hoc efforts to improve conditions or equip 
families to cope with the intolerable. Furthermore, in some cases, most notably the US 
government, pressure is clearly applied to agencies in receipt of funds to limit any public 
advocacy that might embarrass Israel. Thus, organisations such as Save the Children US 
and UNICEF are placed in a challenging position where they must balance accountability 
to the population they are there to serve with the demands of donors and the anxieties of 
their superiors at headquarters. Too often, it seems, downwards accountability is severely 
compromised, if not abandoned. In such a context, the allure of a child protection model 
that focuses on therapeutic measures and on the development of referral networks for 
children at risk of domestic abuse is understandably great. Meanwhile, children continue 
to be beaten up by settlers on their way to school, to be denied access to water sources 
even within their own communities, to have their environment polluted by waste dumped 
by settlements, to be prevented from moving freely in order to access services or to visit 
friends and family, to have their homes invaded by the Israeli army in the middle of the 
night, and to be arrested, tried and imprisoned in ways that confound international law. 
An approach to child protection focused on response to harm rather than prevention 
currently prevails in the oPt. This is clearly the product of pragmatism rather than principle. 
However, such an approach entails risk not only for young Palestinians but for UN and 
international organisations themselves. By failing to pursue children’s protection on the 
basis of international law and human / child rights, and in a manner fully engaged with 
Palestinian children and their families, organisations are at risk of invalidating their own 
claims of neutrality and accountability. Moreover, they should not be surprised if questions 
are raised about the primacy of their commitment to children’s safety and wellbeing. 
Recommendations
INGOs and UN agencies
The understanding of child protection should be developed through the following actions:•	
 -  reassertion of the principles of child protection derived from IHL and IHRL, and 
evidenced in the work of Eglantyne Jebb, founder of Save the Children;
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 -  engagement with Palestinian children and their caregivers about their experiences, 
understanding and aspirations around protection (i.e. not a tick-box survey of pre-
determined issues);
 -  co-analysis by Palestinian, international and intergovernmental organisations to reach 
a consensual understanding that embraces local experience and aspiration as well as 
(i) international legal standards (IHL and IHRL); (ii) current global thinking on child 
protection; (iii) the means of achieving prevention as well as response. 
In developing a locally meaningful understanding of child protection the following •	
issues should be considered: 
 -  the risks to children arising from occupation and appropriation of land and resources 
(rather than generic armed conflict); 
 -  the need for security of children’s movement and access as well as of their space.
A wider array of expertise – in addition to mental health and social work – should be •	
drawn upon in the analysis and development of child protection measures. In particular, 
expertise in the Palestinian context from international relations, anthropological and 
political-economy perspectives should be utilised. 
A mechanism is needed to ensure that the CPWG functions in an accountable, •	
egalitarian and inclusive manner. 
Advocacy and awareness-raising measures should be pursued in a more concerted way •	
involving headquarters staff and partner organisations in Europe, North America and 
across the Arab World. The aim of such efforts should be to influence public opinion 
and build the political will for donor governments to pursue a principled approach to 
child protection in the oPt. 
The potential to address the illegality of Israel’s actions should be explored in other •	
countries, for example by highlighting the link between the settlement produce 
exported to Europe and the harm inflicted upon Palestinian children by settlers and 
their appropriation of land and natural resources.
Funding sources should be reviewed from the perspective of ensuring maximum •	
potential to pursue a principled approach to children’s protection. Organisations that 
seek to be identified as part of civil society should consider carefully the implications of 
accepting large funds from highly restrictive donors such as USAID. 
The work of child protection organisations should be evaluated in terms of their impact in •	
mitigating and preventing harm to Palestinian children arising from political violence – 
especially the effects of occupation-related violence – according to clear principles of 
IHL and IHRL; Conversely, the unwillingness to go beyond ameliorative measures – 
such as psychosocial interventions – should become the focus of critical discussion. 
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Donors
The current characterisation of the context of the oPt as one of development and •	
state-building with elements of humanitarian aid should be re-examined: serious 
consideration should be given to framing the oPt as a long-term human rights and 
protection crisis requiring both a principled approach by donors and their engagement 
in political action to enforce adherence to agreed international norms and laws; a focus 
on root causes rather than effects is essential. 
The rights of children as members of a Palestinian national community should also be •	
addressed; this should include a focus on adherence to the aim and principles of self-
determination.
Donors should consider the extent of their independence from the political agenda of the •	
United States and thus from the pro-Israel lobby that significantly shapes that agenda.
The protection of Palestinian children should be made a primary consideration of •	
the donors: recipients should be evaluated in terms of their capacity to implement a 
principled approach to children’s protection that not only mitigates the impact of harm 
but seeks to prevent this from occuring through efforts at advocacy. Furthermore, there 
should be a coherent approach to funding that ensures advocacy efforts are concerted 
and achieve maximum impact locally and globally. 
In light of concerns to ensure the maximum positive impact upon children’s protection, •	
the shift of funds away from civil society by donors, most notably by DfID, should be 
re-evaluated urgently.
There should be greater support and encouragement for efforts to monitor Israeli •	
insititutions in which Palestinian children’s rights are regularly violated, such as courts, 
prisons, and police stations.
Donors should focus more concertedly on the situation of children in East Jerusalem •	
and Area ‘C’ (under full Israeli control), supporting recipient organisations to gain 
access and challenging Israeli restrictions on the basis of international law.
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1 The aid context
In 2009, as in previous years, the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) was host to a wide 
array of international and UN organisations disbursing a large aid budget in order to 
improve the lives of Palestinian children, both directly and through support for their 
families and wider society.1 Yet, the lives of Palestinian children were generally as difficult 
and dangerous as ever. Across the oPt, children were being killed, maimed, detained, 
tortured and used as human shields by Israeli forces.2 In the West Bank they continued to 
be humiliated and threatened at checkpoints and at risk of violence from Israeli settlers. 
Material, social and educational deprivation were part of the everyday experience of many 
Palestinian children for whom homes and schools had become sites of discord as a result 
of the pressures perpetuated by occupation. 
The wide disparity between the consistent efforts made by representatives of the 
‘international community’ to promote the safety and wellbeing of Palestinian children, and 
the actual results merits deeper consideration. We need to be clear about the constraints 
that international and UN agencies face in protecting Palestinian children in the context 
of occupation and the systematic appropriation of land and resources. The core of this 
briefing paper is concerned with exploration of these constraints. The paper opens with a 
historical overview of the involvement of the international aid community. Our aim in this 
is not to provide a comprehensive account of the setting but rather to highlight specific 
issues that have direct bearing on the effort to protect the young from the direct effects 
and long-term impact of political violence. 
Historical overview
From the Six Day War to the Oslo years (1967–2000)
In 1967, with Israel’s defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War, some 200,000 
Palestinians became refugees, 95,000 of them for a second time.3 The government of Israel 
proceeded to annex East Jerusalem, and occupied the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the 
Syrian Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula.4 The annexation of East Jerusalem and 
efforts to change the status and demographic composition of the West Bank and Gaza are 
in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention as confirmed by the UN Security Council 
in at least 25 resolutions over the years.5 No state has recognised Israel’s annexation of 
East Jerusalem. Since 1967 the State of Israel has declined to offer a clear definition of its 
borders, choosing to conceptualise the West Bank instead as ‘disputed territory’. 
Following its territorial conquests in 1967, the Israeli government quickly established a 
regime of military occupation over the West Bank and Gaza, and innumerable military 
orders based upon that have affected civilian life ever since. Twenty years later, in 1987, 
Palestinians mobilised en masse in the first popular uprising (Intifada) against Israeli 
occupation. The reaction was brutal: the army responded to the largely youthful crowds of 
stone-throwers with military fire, arrests and targeted assassinations of political leaders; 
it imposed prolonged curfews on towns, shutting schools and universities and applying 
severe restrictions on movement. The outbreak of the first Intifada also marked the 
onset of massive funding to the oPt and the establishment of many new NGOs. The first 
6    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
three years until 1990 were characterised by disbursement of solidarity funds: western 
money channelled through the political parties associated with various factions of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) to local NGOs and the popular committees in 
clear support of the national liberation struggle, not solely for relief efforts.6 Before long 
there was a massive influx of development-oriented INGOs focused on the deteriorating 
conditions of the population. Many activists assumed roles as professional development 
specialists, or joined research institutions and independent human rights groups that had 
been working since the end of the 1970s.7
The Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 was followed in 1993 by the Oslo Accords agreed 
by the Israelis and the PLO.8 These events revived support for the vision of a two-state 
solution. For the whole of the 1990s the so-called ‘Middle East Peace Process’ (MEPP) 
provided the framework and rationale for disbursement of funds by western donor 
governments and intergovernmental organisations.9
The orientation of western donors, and the organisations that they support, towards a 
negotiated peace, as promoted by the Quartet of the US, EU, Russia and the UN, continues. 
It is predicated upon conceptualisation of the current situation as one of humanitarian 
crisis arising from conflict between two more or less equivalent parties. As we shall 
explain, this creates particular problems for the efforts to protect Palestinian children. 
Under the Oslo Accords the West Bank was divided into three zones, A, B and C,10 
with different security and civil authorities. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was given 
responsibility for maintaining law and order in the areas it controlled (Area A) and it was 
offered support to form and employ a police force. Israel was granted complete control 
over access and movement of Palestinians and foreigners from and to the territory by land, 
air and sea. Moreover, it was given responsibility for collecting and delivering to the PA, 
on a monthly basis, rents deriving from the commercial exchange of Palestinian goods 
with the outside world and from the remittances of the Palestinian work force employed 
in Israel and the settlements.11 Meanwhile, since the signing of the Oslo Accords Israel has 
continued with a project of systematic appropriation. The three core dimensions of this 
project have been as follows:
Territorial control:•	 12 land appropriation and control of natural resources marking a slow 
but steady process of territorial fragmentation and enclavisation, the separation of the 
West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem; mass population transfer through support to the 
Israeli settlement enterprise and, to sustain it, the construction of a by-pass Israeli-only 
road system, land confiscation, and home demolition.13
Control of Palestinian daily life, access and movement: checkpoints, roadblocks •	
and a system of ‘permits’ and travel restrictions; the institution of an ID regime that 
distinguishes between Israeli passport holders, Jerusalemites and oPt residents; the 
application of a closure system in the territories, and the imposition of curfews on 
Palestinian towns and villages.
De-development: closure of the Israeli job market to the Palestinian workforce resulting •	
in an exponential increase in poverty; control of the borders and the closure system 
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discouraging private sector investment and curtailing trade relations. In breach of the 
‘Paris Protocols’ Israel also used fiscal measures as a tool to exert political pressure: for 
example, it arbitrarily retained PA commercial taxes and duties and Palestinian workers’ 
remittances, amounting to 60% of PA revenues in 1997,14 thereby compromising the 
Authority’s financial sovereignty and its ability to deliver services. 
By 1994 the conditions of the Palestinian population had become so dire that the 
international community greatly increased its emergency assistance.15 This continued 
throughout the 1990s, during which time the PA failed to develop into the efficient proto-
state institution of governance sought by western donors, becoming bogged down in 
corrupt and nepotistic practices. 
The second Intifada and the increase in humanitarian assistance (2000–2009)
In contrast to the popular character of the first Intifada, with widespread non-violent 
resistance and demonstrations, the Al Aqsa Intifada was characterised by rapid 
militarisation, direct violence against Israeli civilians and extensive retaliation measures 
by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF).16 A generation of disenfranchised youth living 
in despair had grown angry and were willing to fight, in some individual cases even 
undertaking suicide attacks. This brought only greater incidence and severity of attacks 
from Israel, house demolitions, mass arrests, worsened economic conditions and a tighter 
regime of closure affecting peoples’ access to employment, health and education. By 
2004 dependence on food and cash handouts had risen to unprecedented levels: the UN 
estimating that 70% of Palestinians were already, or at risk of becoming, food insecure.17
In 2002 the Israeli government initiated the construction of what it called the ‘Separation 
Fence’ or, in the terminology of its opponents, ‘the Wall’, which Ann Le More describes as 
‘the ultimate form of closure, fragmentation and segregation’.18 The Fence / Wall has not 
yet been completed but it is estimated to run for more than 700km, with 85% of its length 
built on privately owned Palestinian land.19 Justified by Israel as a temporary measure to 
prevent suicide operations, the Fence / Wall creates an extra layer of ‘facts on the ground’. 
Currently 10,000 Palestinians live under a severely restricted regime of movement and 
access in the closed military area between the Fence / Wall and the Green Line in the 
Northern West Bank, with a further 25,000 likely to be enclosed in a ‘seam area’ by the 
end of the construction.20 The majority of the 250,000 Jerusalemite Palestinians will also 
reside between the Green Line and the Fence / Wall. In 2004 the International Court of 
Justice issued an advisory opinion declaring the Fence / Wall illegal under international 
law and urging Israel to end its construction and pay Palestinians full reparation for the 
damages caused. Moreover it recognised Third Party responsibility of all states and the 
responsibility of the UN in ensuring Israel’s compliance and advised ‘not to render aid or 
assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction’.21
The settler population in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has continued to grow 
steadily and to date about half a million Israeli settlers live in 120 official settlements 
in the West Bank built fully or partly on privately owned Palestinian land and in 102 
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unauthorised outposts; 190,000 settlers live in occupied East Jerusalem.22 A small, but 
significant minority of the settlers have pursued campaigns of violence and intimidation 
against Palestinian villagers and destruction of their property. As we shall see, some of this 
violence has been directed explicitly at children. 
The victory of Hamas over Fatah in the 2006 elections marked an important turning-point 
for the international community. Following a short-lived attempt at unity government – 
which was not recognised by the West – and violent struggle between Fatah and Hamas 
in 2007, two de facto governments were officially established: a Fatah-led ‘Caretaker 
Government’ in the West Bank led by Prime Minister (PM) Salam Fayyad, which found 
favour with western governments, and the government of Hamas in Gaza led by PM Ismail 
Haniya. With the US and EU in the lead, western donors have eschewed contact with and 
assistance to the Hamas government. The US has adopted a particularly hard line, denying 
material support to any institutions associated with the government, including schools 
and medical facilities and imposing a draconian and highly restrictive licence system on 
international agencies that seek to operate in the Strip with USAID funds. Together with 
the EU, the other members of the Quartet – Russia and the UN – have ultimately accepted 
a position in regard to Hamas that ensures international isolation. In a leaked end of 
mission report following his resignation, the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East 
Peace Process, Alvaro de Soto commented, ‘The devastating consequences of the Quartet 
position have been well documented, including in UN Security Council briefings…. 
The precipitous decline of the standard of living of Palestinians, particularly but by no 
means exclusively in Gaza, has been disastrous, both in humanitarian terms and in the 
perilous weakening of Palestinian institutions. International assistance, which had been 
gradually shifting to development and institutional reform, has reverted largely to the 
humanitarian.’23
The years 2008 and 2009 saw an escalation of violence and a gradual worsening of the 
humanitarian situation, particularly in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli military operations 
Warm Winter (February–March 2008) and Cast Lead (December 2008–January 2009), 
took the lives of at least 1500 Palestinians, including 386 children.24 In the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem, occupation and systematic appropriation continued. According 
to a 2009 UN account of the situation, ‘nearly 40% of the Palestinian population is food-
insecure. Most Palestinians cannot exercise their basic human rights to free movement, 
employment, basic services, and self-determination. Serious violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law, by all parties to the conflict, continue to take place in 
a disturbing climate of impunity.’25
In the period 1994–2009 the international community have engaged in both development-
focused activities and humanitarian relief. Between 1994 and 2000 the main focus 
was upon development with small elements of emergency assistance in response to 
specific incidents, such as house demolitions and population displacement by the Israeli 
authorities. The outbreak of the second Intifada led to a major increase in the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance. In 2009 the international community of donors and agencies 
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were engaged in a complex mixture of development initiatives – concerning areas such 
as support for state building, governance and security sector reform – together with 
programming under the umbrella of ‘emergency’ that included child protection efforts. 
A note on methods and focus
This briefing paper is based on a combination of secondary sources – including published 
and ‘grey literature’ – as well as field-based interviews and focus groups conducted during 
seven months of fieldwork in 2009. Subsequent interviews were conducted in the UK in 
person and by telephone with former and current senior agency staff from various child-
focused organisations. Around 120 interviews and focus groups were conducted with 
individuals and groups that ranged from donor agency staff, PA officials, UN, INGO and 
NGO staff, teachers, parents and children in a range of locations across the West Bank 
and East Jerusalem. The research began with a roundtable of child protection experts in 
Oxford in February 2009 and ended with review and feedback of a penultimate draft by 
several of these experts and others in August 2010. Given the highly sensitive nature of the 
topics addressed in this briefing paper we have anonymised most of our sources, except 
where the information given was purely factual. 
Due to issues of access and time, we were not able to visit Gaza. Moreover, we were aware 
that the issues here surrounding the role of the international community were liable to 
differ in important and complex ways from those in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 
most obviously due to the stance taken by donor governments in respect of the Hamas-led 
government. However, we would urge that a similar study be undertaken in Gaza at the 
earliest opportunity. At the time of writing (September 2010) Israel’s blockade remains in 
force while the international community issues occasional statements of displeasure and 
continues with piecemeal, ameliorative measures on the ground.
1 0    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
2 Child protection: principles, policy and practice
Child protection at the global level
In recent years wide consensus has emerged around the definition of ‘child protection’ 
as efforts ‘to prevent and respond to violence, exploitation and abuse against children’.26 
This definition consists of two core elements. Firstly, it indicates that protection concerns 
prevention of harm and not only response once the damage has been done. In other 
words, child protection is imagined as more than solely ameliorative. Secondly, the notion 
of harm is elaborated in terms of violence, exploitation and abuse. This definition is broad 
enough to encompass the policies and practices of organisations across diverse settings 
around the globe, providing a reference point for ‘child protection’ as a sector as it has 
emerged in recent years alongside other sectors such as health and education. 
Within the field of humanitarian emergency – in which organisations such as UNICEF, 
Save the Children, Plan, Worldvision and Terre des hommes are prominent child-
focused actors – protection efforts are designed in relation to two broadly differentiated 
contexts: natural disaster and armed conflict. In settings identified as ‘armed conflict’ 
a number of particular child protection issues are commonly identified as priority 
concerns. These include landmines, child recruitment, family reunification, mental health, 
internal displacement, and so on. Nevertheless, child protection programmes in very 
different settings often exhibit similar characteristics due to the dominant role played by 
professionals from social work and mental health in this field. Such common characteristics 
include an individualistic orientation, as well as the focus upon an assumed universal 
set of children’s needs.27 Moreover, child protection – as conceptualised and pursued by 
mental health and social work experts – has tended to focus on addressing problems at the 
immediate level: with the individual child and his / her immediate family. Questions about 
the structural factors – and the processes of political economy that lie behind them – that 
may cause grave and systemic threat to children and which therefore need to be addressed 
as a priority have generally arisen little within the field of child protection as shaped by 
social work and mental health. As we shall see, the pursuit of child protection according to 
an individualistic, generalising and apolitical model has particular consequences in the oPt. 
Efforts to achieve greater co-ordination and commonality across the humanitarian field 
have grown apace, particularly as part of the process of Global Humanitarian Reform 
instigated in 2005. While the need to ground practice in the realities of local context 
has been recognised to a certain extent, in practice humanitarian organisations are 
increasingly oriented to standardisation across a range of humanitarian efforts. This is 
noticeable in the area of child protection where a global-level dialogue is leading to the 
emergence of handbooks, guidelines and checklists with the aim – explicit or otherwise – 
of ensuring a standard approach by field staff across diverse settings.28 The move towards 
standardisation by humanitarian organisations is one element of an approach that 
prioritises technical competence within thematic sectors over analytical skills and over 
local knowledge of the history, politics and culture of the settings in which programmes 
are pursued. This briefing paper therefore differs from much of the recent academic 
writing on child protection which is of a general, globalising nature since we take as our 
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focus a particular setting – the oPt in 2009. We explore the questions raised by applying 
a standard child protection approach in this setting where understandings of and 
aspirations for children’s protection are liable to diverge considerably: reflecting both local 
understandings of children’s development and the collective aspirations of a people living 
for decades under occupation.
Principles of child protection 
Child protection emerged as a distinct field of humanitarian action only in the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the ethical framework for protecting the young in situations of armed 
conflict and political violence can be traced back to the early twentieth century. In the 
wake of the First World War, Eglantyne Jebb and colleagues in Britain argued passionately 
for the protection of children of the defeated enemy. Across Central Europe huge numbers 
of children were at risk of starvation as a result of the blockade imposed by the victorious 
Allied Powers. Arguing that ‘it is impossible for us as normal human beings to watch 
children starve to death without making an effort to save them’,29 Jebb confronted British 
government policy head-on. At one point in her struggle she was arrested for distributing 
leaflets and posters in London’s Trafalgar Square that included the words ‘What does 
Britain stand for? Starving babies, torturing women, killing the old’ alongside images 
of emaciated Austrian children.30 The authorities responded by arresting, charging and 
convicting Jebb under the Defence of the Realm Act. Turning the publicity surrounding 
her case to advantage, she galvanised popular support and shortly afterwards established 
Save the Children which, over the course of the twentieth century grew into a global 
organisation at the forefront of efforts by civil society to improve the lives of children. Jebb 
was also instrumental in the creation of the 1924 Declaration of the Rights of the Child – a 
forerunner of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) – and strove 
to ensure that ‘the League of Nations should recognise the question of the protection of 
children as one of its fundamental duties’.31
The philosophy and actions of Jebb constitute an important foundation and touchstone 
for the ethics of children’s protection across national borders. Here we draw attention to 
four key features of her approach that are especially relevant to the Palestinian context. 
Firstly, central to Jebb’s philosophy was the principle that the protection of children should 
transcend all considerations based upon national self-interest – a view that resonates 
with the tenets at the heart of the notion of human security as it emerged in the 1990s.32 
Secondly, Jebb’s actions were focused on addressing the causes of threat to children’s 
survival and wellbeing – in this case removing the blockade of the Allied Powers – rather 
than seeking to alleviate the effects of this blockade. Thirdly, in order to deal with causes 
and not simply effects, Jebb challenged the state head-on. This illustrates the inevitability 
of political engagement, calling the state to account on the basis of clear principle. Finally, 
fundamental to Jebb’s achievement in establishing Save the Children was the mobilisation 
of public opinion. In the immediate aftermath of the First World War Jebb faced virulent 
opposition to her call that consideration and resources be given to German and Austrian 
children. Nevertheless, she persisted and managed to win over sufficient support from 
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the public at large and amongst those with power to proceed in her efforts.33 To these four 
features of Jebb’s approach we might add that visionary and determined leadership was 
clearly in evidence and vital to the success of efforts to protect children.
Jebb can be seen as a pioneer of what is popularly known as ‘the child rights based 
approach’ that, more latterly, has been adopted by UNICEF and various child-focused 
INGOs, including almost all members of the International Save the Children Alliance. The 
rights-based approach has often been contrasted with an alternative orientation towards 
the fulfilment of basic needs that dominated development and aid efforts for much of the 
twentieth century. The difference between the two has been articulated as follows:
The basic needs approach often aims to obtain additional resources to help a marginalised 
group obtain access to services. A human rights approach, in contrast, calls for existing 
community resources to be shared more equally, so that everyone has access to the same 
services. Assisting people to assert their rights, therefore, often means involvement in political 
debate. While a basic needs approach does not necessarily recognise wilful or historical 
marginalisation, a human rights approach aims directly at overcoming such marginalisation.
The second important difference between the two approaches pertains to motivation. Basic 
needs can, in principle, be met through benevolent or charitable actions. Actions based on a 
human rights approach are based on legal and moral obligations to carry out a duty that will 
permit a subject to enjoy her or his right.34
The right to protection is a core principle of the UNCRC. As such its realisation can be 
seen as inevitably entailing ‘involvement in political debate’ drawing upon legal obligations 
to call duty bearers to account: most particularly States Parties to the UNCRC and other 
relevant instruments and conventions. From the perspective of humanitarianism as 
conventionally pursued, such engagement in the political realm would be inadmissable: 
a violation of the core principle of neutrality. However, this principle has been widely re-
evaluated in recent years as part of efforts to develop a ‘new humanitarianism’. Fiona Cox 
has characterised this as follows:
Above all new humanitarianism is political. It sees apolitical, neutral, humanitarian relief as 
both naive and morally questionable. Instead new humanitarians argue for a more politically 
conscious aid which can assess the present and future impact of aid interventions on the 
politics of conflict and ensure that aid is linked to military and diplomatic tools in a coherent 
conflict-resolution strategy.35
While there has been widespread loss of support for the maintenance of a neutral stance, 
impartiality remains a guiding principle for many humanitarian agencies. Neutrality is 
commonly interpreted to necessitate avoidance of public criticism of those authorities 
responsible for human rights abuses. By contrast, impartiality entails the consistent 
application of legal standards in an organisation’s statements about and dealings with all 
parties in a conflict. 
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Commentators, including Cox, have pointed out some of the important limitations of 
the political engagement entailed in this ‘new humanitarianism’ arguing, for example, 
that it can lead agencies to distinguish ‘victims’ who merit the aid necessary for survival 
from others cast as undeserving ‘perpetrators’, thereby forgoing the universalism of 
humanitarian aid. However, most of the objections voiced about the more politicised 
disposition of ‘new humanitarianism’ are applied to examples of all-out warfare between 
more or less equal enemies. It is questionable whether their arguments apply to a situation 
of decades-long occupation and appropriation where, except for short periods of extreme 
violence, suffering of the civilian population does not relate to dire shortage of the 
immediate means of survival. Instead, as the paper explores in relation to the protection 
of Palestinian children, the problems arise as a result of the systematic denial of the means 
and resources needed for pursuit of a viable existence over the longer term: access to 
water, land, and basic services of education and health, freedom of travel and association, 
and so on. The problem is, at its core, a political one requiring, above all, a response based 
on invocation of clear legal standards. In such a setting as the oPt, the argument in favour 
of impartial political engagement would seem especially compelling. 
Not all the international child-focused organisations currently working in the oPt to 
protect Palestinian children explicitly frame their work in terms of rights or international 
law. Nevertheless, whatever the language used, we would maintain that child protection 
is an inherently ethical enterprise predicated, as it is, upon the assumption that children 
should be afforded particular protection and that their survival should be guaranteed 
regardless of the circumstances. The responsibility to provide such protection may be 
enacted in a paternalistic manner that provides little opportunity for the young themselves 
to define their own protection needs or that may limit their role in society on the grounds 
of ensuring their safety. However, such paternalism is not inevitable: while the relationship 
between protection and participation is complex, one need not prevent the other. Indeed, 
it might be argued that protection can only be enhanced by approaching the young as 
capable participants in the identification and pursuit of appropriate strategies. 
The oPt as context for child protection efforts
According to the standard categories of context requiring emergency efforts by child 
protection organisations – armed conflict and natural disaster – the oPt is clearly 
conceptualised as afflicted by the former. This characterisation of the setting coincides 
with and is reinforced by the current language of western states that describes the situation 
primarily as the ‘Arab-Israeli conflict’ or the ‘Israel / Palestine conflict’ for which a ‘Peace 
Process’ to reach a ‘negotiated settlement’ is necessary. In many general academic texts 
about contemporary warfare as well as in the western media ‘Israel / Palestine’ is similarly 
conveyed as a setting of armed conflict where, as in other such settings, two more or less 
equal parties are pitted against each other in a battle for land and resources. 
Although the Israelis and Palestinians are conceptualised as broadly equivalent parties 
to conflict, in respect of the basic security of children their treatment differs. Western 
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governments have consistently expressed commitment to the security of Israelis, 
providing financial and military support for this stated purpose.36 Furthermore, this has 
been repeatedly stated as a pre-requisite of any peace deal. By contrast, the security of 
Palestinians, including children, consists overwhelmingly of ad hoc remedial measures. 
The underlying assumption is that the security of Palestinians will come as a result of a 
peace deal whereas for Israelis a peace deal is conditional upon security. 
The political violence witnessed in the oPt is certainly a source of considerable harm 
sufficient to justify the presence of international and UN agencies. However, this is best 
understood in terms of, firstly, occupation (coupled with the ongoing appropriation of 
land and resources) and resistance to occupation continuing over many years. Lisa Taraki 
describes the experience of Palestinians in the following terms: 
… the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have actually been living in a state of 
protracted war for many decades; the ubiquitous state of being on an emergency footing may 
wax or wane, but it is always there, and the awareness that Palestinian existence and identity 
in the land are under threat is very much a part of the dominant Palestinian ethos.37
The second major source of political violence is interfactional fighting, principally between 
forces associated with Hamas and those of Fatah. Without wishing to ignore or trivialise 
the threat to children from the violence between Palestinian political factions, our concern 
here is primarily with occupation and resistance on the grounds that this is of far greater 
duration, and has caused incomparably greater harm to Palestinian children both in kind 
and scale. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that Palestinian in-fighting has been 
and continues to be exacerbated by Israel (and the US) as part of its efforts to maintain 
control over the Palestinian population in the oPt.38
Almost all international and intergovernmental agencies working on child protection in 
the oPt refer explicitly to Israel’s occupation. Indeed occupation is clearly seen as a source 
of various kinds of threat to Palestinian children. However, the challenges presented by 
occupation and associated efforts to appropriate land and resources are not understood 
as sufficiently specific to cause the relevance of the global approach to child protection 
in armed conflict to be brought into question. Thus, by default, occupation is treated 
as a kind of conflict setting, rather than as a distinct situation that might require the 
development of particular thinking and measures. We would argue that such distinction is 
not only merited from a theoretical perspective but fundamental to the efficacy of efforts 
at child protection. Rather than approaching the task of protecting Palestinian children 
with the language and tools of ‘humanitarian emergency’, it would be more relevant and 
efficacious to consider the context as one of a ‘human rights / protection crisis’, thereby 
indicating the political engagement entailed in any meaningful intervention. To illustrate 
this central point we now turn to discuss below the specific nature of challenges to 
Palestinian children’s protection arising from Israel’s occupation and ongoing efforts to 
appropriate land and resources. 
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3 Occupation and children’s protection
Interviewer:
‘What do children do to protect themselves, what do they have to protect themselves?’
Interviewee:
‘Nothing. I would say they have nothing. Their only resource is their family and their school, 
but even the family can’t protect them, they can’t protect their own children.’ 
From interview with a Palestinian NGO worker
Israel’s occupation and the ongoing efforts of the state and its citizens to appropriate 
land and resources invalidate any assumption of a frontline from which children may be 
kept distant and safe. Here the ‘enemy’ officially controls most of the territory wherein 
the civilian population live and readily ignores agreements about autonomy in respect of 
remaining areas, invoking its own national security in justification. As in many settings 
of armed conflict, international and intergovernmental agencies in the oPt devote much 
effort to securing special areas of safety for children, often employing the notion of ‘child-
friendly space’. However, without even an armed force or police to counter the incursions 
of Israel’s army and the predations of its settlers, any space of Palestinian civilian life, 
however intimate, can be invaded with impunity at any time. Agreement between Israel 
and the PA about Palestinian jurisdiction over certain parts of the West Bank (‘Area A’) has 
proven of little consequence to an occupying power that undertakes regular incursions – 
involving assassinations, arrest and destruction of property – into whichever city, village 
or refugee camp it chooses.39
Chronic vulnerability to Israeli violence is well understood by Palestinian children 
themselves. For example, in the course of a drawing and discussion session with a group 
of ten and eleven year olds in a refugee camp outside Nablus we asked about the places 
they would go to in order to feel safe when there was an incursion by the IDF. Initially 
a couple of children in the group mentioned their homes. However, one boy countered 
this by saying ‘there is nowhere safe for us, the soldiers go everywhere, even into our 
houses’. Others in the group quickly agreed. This view has been articulated many times by 
Palestinian children.40
Within ‘Area C’ (under full Israeli control) the situation is especially bad. Here Palestinians 
are systematically denied the possibility to attempt to create safe, ‘child-friendly’ space. 
It is virtually impossible to obtain permits from the Israeli authorities to build upon 
Palestinian-owned land, with the consequence that even play areas are subject to 
destruction. This has occurred, for example, in the village of Azzoun near Qalqilya where 
a children’s park was built in 2005 with international funding and shortly afterwards 
destroyed by the Israeli authorities.41 International organisations were warned not to 
respond by these same authorities and, at the time of our visit in August 2009, the park 
remained in ruins.42
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The relevance of the notion of ‘frontline’, from which children might be distanced, is also 
brought into serious question by Israel’s multiple division of the territory of the West Bank 
and its severance from East Jerusalem (and complete isolation from Gaza). Innumerable 
fixed checkpoints and large swathes of land given over to settlements or to ‘closed military 
zones’ systematically hinder the free movement of Palestinians, enclosing them within 
enclaves surrounded by settlements and Israeli military installations often built upon 
hilltops that loom over them.43 Civilians, including children, are subject to the random 
use of ‘flying’ checkpoints, to the arbitrary closure of crossing points between Palestinian 
areas, and to the imposition of curfews that suspend public life entirely. They must also 
negotiate their way around earth mounds that close off access roads to many villages, and 
avoid roads that have been designated for the use of settlers alone. In practice all of this 
means that the occupation forces may easily access and isolate Palestinian communities. 
In some locations extremist settlers pursue violent activities that deliberately threaten and 
thereby further curtail the movement of children, as illustrated by the situation in the area 
of Al-Tuwani in the South Hebron Hills (see Case Study 1). 
Case Study 1. Settler violence in al-Tuwani
In various locations across the West Bank isolation and lack of state presence 
have left children vulnerable to direct violence. The abuse of children living in 
the villages around al-Tuwani by neighbouring settlers is one example. Around 
600–700 Palestinians live in al-Tuwani and the seven surrounding villages in the 
South Hebron Hills. This locale is within Area C of the West Bank and thus under full 
Israeli control. In the 1980s two settlements were constructed nearby – Ma’on and 
Carmel. Adjacent to Ma’on an outpost – Havat Ma’on – was constructed in 1997 
housing some of the most extremist settlers in the oPt.1
The Palestinians living in the vicinity of these settlements have been subjected to 
repeated acts of violence and measures that violate their basic human rights. These 
include direct assault, poisoning the land on which they graze their sheep, stealing 
and burning their crops.2 In addition, the settlers have striven to ensure that all 
efforts to develop the infrastructure of the villages – water supply, electricity, 
homes and public buildings – are quashed. The aim seems clear: to provoke the 
Palestinians into leaving the area entirely. 
While the various acts of the settlers all impact negatively upon children as 
members of the Palestinian communities living in the area, the violence inflicted 
upon them directly in the course of their journey to and from school represents an 
explicit threat to them as children. The local school serving the area is located in al-
Tuwani. The path along which children from two of the neighbouring villages walk 
to school passes between Ma’on and Havat Ma’on and a section has been fenced 
off by the settlers. While volunteers from the US-based Christian Peacemakers 
Team (CPT) and the Italian organisation Operation Dove (OD) accompany the 
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children for most of the path, no adults are allowed to walk with the children along 
the section that has been fenced off. The children must, therefore, go alone and 
on numerous occasions they have been attacked.3 Even the volunteers have been 
attacked on occasion yet they are less likely to be arrested than adult villagers who 
are frequently taken into custody by the Israeli authorities when they act to defend 
their families and property. 
In 2004 the Israeli Knesset mandated the IDF to provide an escort to the children 
for their passage through this fenced off area in order to protect them from the 
settlers. CPT and OD monitor the situation in the area on a daily basis and confirm 
that the army frequently fails to fulfil its obligations. When an army jeep does 
come to escort the children it is often late or the soldiers drive too fast through 
the fenced off area and the children must run behind them to keep up. The Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 
Ms Radhika Coomaraswamy, raised the situation of children in this area with the 
Israeli authorities following her visit in April 2007. In her report to the UN General 
Assembly in 2008 she noted that ‘the Government of Israel was committed to 
investigating and taking appropriate action on the case of renewed attacks by 
settlers on schoolchildren in al-Tuwani village.’4 However, there is no evidence 
of change on the ground: in the 2007–8 school year there were 14 documented 
attacks on children by settlers.5 A local community leader offered us the following 
observation about the situation in al-Tuwani:
‘So since ’67 until now [the Israelis] are working on this strategy, this strategy of 
evacuation of the people. They have their plans just to make the Palestinian life in 
this area harder and harder: to be easier for them to evacuate us.
‘The CPT accompany [the children], watching everything. So it was helpful until now 
but really we need solutions. We have to take these settlers away from [the children].’
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Access of children to basic services, to social and leisure opportunities and to the care and 
nurturance of relatives beyond the immediate household has become subject to the whim 
of the Israeli administration and military forces. For children with special needs who 
require expert services available in a limited number of urban locations, the restrictions 
on access and mobility can pose particular threats to their wellbeing and development.44 
When children move, particularly outside major urban centres such as Nablus, they 
are placed at risk of physical and verbal abuse, arbitrary arrest, and lengthy delays (at 
permanent and ‘flying’ checkpoints) under highly unsuitable conditions.45
Constraints upon movement not only constitute a source of risk in themselves but also 
limit the opportunities for children to gain first-hand knowledge of areas beyond their 
own immediate town or village and thereby develop a sense of Palestine as a national 
community and as the territory of a future state. This was sharply revealed in several 
focus group discussions that we conducted with both parents and children in which we 
mapped out the trips taken by the adults when young and compared this with the trips 
of the current young generation. Thus, for example, in contrast to their parents who had 
travelled to numerous locations within and beyond the West Bank on school trips, present 
day pupils are largely constrained to a very narrow range of destinations such as Jericho 
and the forlorn zoo in Qalqilya.46 As one Palestinian NGO worker commented to us: 
… this morning I was really really upset because my daughters were going on a school trip 
and I know that just ten years ago a school trip meant that they were going up to Haifa, and 
going up to Tel Aviv / Jaffa, and one time they actually went to Jordan, stuff like that. And so 
this school trip one of my daughters was going to Jericho, which we go to every week, and one 
of them was going to Jenin and Qalqilya. And that’s a school trip… I think that this is a larger 
political issue – it’s trying to restructure and contain how people perceive their living spaces 
and how society is being formed. And we’re seeing the ramifications of that. I think that this 
can be easily documented. We’re having discussions now within our own society. It’s just like 
how this separating out of the West Bank and Gaza has led to two people. Whether we like 
it or not there is this sense that this is Gaza, this is West Bank and they’re really different 
entities. And now we’re moving more and more to this… well Jerusalem is also a different 
entity, and North and South (West Bank). And you can see that happening across the board. 
And it happens not just in terms of making it difficult to access but how we are structuring 
our society.
The Government of Israel, through practices of containment that violate basic entitlements 
to freedom of movement guaranteed under International Law, is arguably undermining 
the formation of a national citizenry that would be central to the viability of any future 
Palestinian state. While protection of children’s possibility to travel within and beyond their 
own homeland and to interact freely with fellow citizens does not figure explicitly within 
current global notions of child protection, this is a prominent concern for parents and 
relates directly to the conditions of occupation and appropriation in which the Palestinians 
have lived for several decades. In any case, freedom of movement is a basic human right 
and is articulated clearly in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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Under conditions of military occupation and appropriation even the most immediate 
spaces of Palestinian life can become alienated, as natural resources are placed off-limits. 
In particular, conventional water sources, often situated in the centre of villages, are 
commonly closed off and the supply diverted to nearby settlements. This has important 
implications for children’s protection (see Case Study 2) 
Israeli actions in limiting the access of Palestinian communities to water supplies – 
directly and through controls on movement – have meant that water consumption 
per capita commonly falls well below accepted international levels. WHO and USAID 
recommend a minimum of 100 litres per capita per day (l/c/d) for domestic use. Yet, for 
Palestinians in the West Bank the average is around 63, in many communities it is as little 
as 30 and in a handful less than 10 l/c/d.47 For Israelis the average is 330 l/c/d and for the 
settlers it is understood to be even higher than that.48 While Israeli settler children enjoy 
swimming pools and play on lush lawns, their Palestinian peers, according to UNDP, 
‘experience one of the highest levels of water scarcity in the world.’49 Moreover, not only do 
Palestinian children in the oPt commonly suffer from lack of the most basic commodity 
necessary for human survival – clean water – many reside in locations rendered toxic 
through the dumping of human and industrial waste by settlements and Israeli contractors 
from within the State of Israel proper.50
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Case Study 2. Access to water denied in al-Hadidiya
Al-Hadidiya in the northern Jordan Valley is a community experiencing immense 
hardship due to lack of water. Here the Palestinian residents have been denied 
access to a water source situated at the heart of the land on which they live and 
graze their sheep. Instead, they must have water delivered for which they pay 
highly inflated prices, placing a huge burden on many impoverished families. The 
price of delivered water is partly inflated due to the difficulties of delivery arising 
from the constraints on movement within the West Bank. By contrast settlements 
enjoy unlimited water on demand at prices subsidised by Israel.
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A temporary structure in the village 
of al-Hadidiya with a delivered tanker 
of water nearby. All infrastructural 
development has been forbidden: 
homes and water systems constructed 
by the villagers have been destroyed.1
A water source in the middle of the area 
of al-Hadidiya fenced off by the Israeli 
authorites. Water from this source 
is pumped to the nearby settlement 
and its hothouses, where herbs and 
vegetables are grown for export.
Israeli settlement hothouses in the 
Jordan Valley.
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4  The role of UN and international organisations in 
protecting Palestinian children
The Institutional architecture of child protection in the oPt
A key element of the 2005 Global Humanitarian Reform was the creation of the Cluster 
system: bringing together agencies working on various thematic areas. A key aim of this 
system was to strengthen coordination and partnership, to fill the response gaps, avoid 
duplication and to promote a standardised and professional response.51 Protection is one 
such thematic area around which a cluster has been created. Globally, the focal point 
for the Protection Cluster is usually the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR). Since ‘protection’ covers a very broad range of activity, sub-clusters have 
been established for dealing with specific issues. In the humanitarian architecture at both 
global and country levels, Child Protection is addressed by a sub-group generally chaired 
by UNICEF. At the country level UNICEF commonly leads a CPWG, bringing together 
the relevant government institutions, INGOs, civil society organisations and other inter-
governmental agencies. Such is the case in the oPt. 
The Protection Cluster in the oPt is co-chaired by the UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR). This cluster is one of the most under-funded in the oPt. In 2009, 
the Protection Cluster requested a total amount of $20,196,906 million, of which only 
about 25% was granted.52 The general mandate of this Cluster is that of coordinating all 
protection interventions, including advocacy activities: hence all organisations, local, 
international and intergovernmental, are invited to participate in the regular coordination 
meetings. The CPWG updates the Protection Cluster Lead with child protection data 
and information about its activities. A Mental Health and Psychosocial Working Group 
(MHPSS WG) has also been created, co-chaired by the UNICEF Child Protection-
Psychosocial Officer and an officer from the World Health Organisation. A more recent 
innovation is the ‘1612 Working Group’ which monitors and reports to the UN Security 
Council on violations identified in Resolution 1612 (2005) concerning ‘children and armed 
conflict’.53 This group was instigated by staff at SCUK, DCI/PS, UNICEF and United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and is now headed by a dedicated officer 
employed by UNICEF. 
Child protection actors
The Palestinian Authority
Child protection is a fundamental responsibility of the state as articulated explicitly or 
assumed by various international legal instruments and conventions.54 This responsibility 
involves measures to prevent any form of violence, abuse and neglect as well as the care of 
children for whom prevention measures have proven insufficient. The state is responsible 
for drafting national laws ensuring that the rights of the child are adequately addressed 
and for enhancing national policies and allocating sufficient budgetary resources for the 
functioning of such a system throughout its sovereign territory. 
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In the case of Palestine, more than sixty years of conflict and forty years of occupation, 
deep aid dependence and the 2007 split between a Hamas-led government in Gaza and 
Fatah-led government in the West Bank, have profoundly hindered the development of 
efficient child protection policies and practices. The geographical fragmentation of the 
oPt, and the political and de jure divisions between Hamas and Fatah resulted in a lack of 
collaboration by the two governments in Gaza and the West Bank, causing the indefinite 
postponement of important bills, such as the Juvenile Justice Law.55
The election of Hamas in 2006 led to the suspension by the international community of all 
assistance thereby seriously undermining governmental capacity to protect children and 
causing damage to structures that had taken years to put in place. Support was restored to 
the PA in the West Bank when the Fatah-led caretaker government was installed in 2007. 
However, in Gaza the government authorities remain isolated and their role in protecting 
children compromised. 
In spite of the odds, in 2005 the PA in the West Bank enacted arguably one of the most 
advanced Child Laws in the Middle East and North Africa region, aligning itself with 
international legal obligations towards the fulfilment of children’s right to protection 
by attempting to incorporate the basic principles of the UNCRC.56 The Child Law 
and the Social Affairs Law ascribe to the Ministry of Social Affairs’ (MoSA) General 
Administration of Childhood and the Family the responsibility to assign a Protection 
Officer in the 13 governorates with the duty to investigate and respond to suspected cases 
of violence against children and refer the child to the appropriate guardian, organisation 
or protection centre. 
Palestinian civil society
As of 2004 there were in excess of 150 Palestinian organisations that identified themselves 
as dealing with children’s rights and needs in general and child protection in particular.57 
Due to the lack of a properly functioning state, and Israel’s non-compliance with its 
international legal obligations,58 Palestinian civil society has historically operated as the 
main channel of service provision and child protection, laying the groundwork for the 
creation and implementation of a national child protection system. Organisations and 
charitable societies work in areas such as disability, foster care, poverty, children in conflict 
with the law, as well as all issues pertaining to violence caused by the Israeli occupation. 
With the establishment of the PA and the enactment of legislation and policies, civil 
society has also acted as a governmental watchdog: lobbying for the improvement of the 
system as well as advocating that duty-bearers be held accountable for the protection of 
Palestinian children, as laid out in international conventions. 
Solidarity Groups and Non-Violent Resistance Groups are also very present, particularly 
in the most neglected areas of the West Bank. These include organisations such as the 
International Solidarity Movement, Christian Peacemakers Team and Operation Dove; 
Palestinian organisations including the Jordan Valley Solidarity Campaign; and Israeli and 
joint Israeli / Palestinian groups such as Rabbis for Human Rights, Ta’ayush and Windows.
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United Nations
As mentioned above, UNICEF leads the Child Protection Working Group in the oPt, 
the aim of which is to strengthen Child Protection ‘through a well coordinated response, 
including coordinated service provision, information collection and advocacy efforts’.59 In its 
institutional capacity building role, UNICEF works closely with the PA in the development 
of laws and systems intended to enhance the protection of Palestinian children. 
The primary responsibility of the UNRWA is to support the refugee population in the 
oPt, providing schools, health clinics and community centres. Through these locations 
it seeks to detect and manage cases of abuse amongst refugee children. UNRWA does 
not have a clear child protection mandate. However, in 2009 it created a new post of 
Senior Protection Officer and has since recruited further staff to work on protection 
issues particularly in respect of vulnerable groups of refugees.60 UNRWA participates 
in the CPWG and in the meetings of the 1612 Working Group, providing data and other 
information for monitoring and documentation purposes. 
INGOs
At the time of our research in 2009 most INGOs approached child protection in the 
framework of an emergency response. This was partly a result of changes amongst the 
donors who, with the formulation of the Palestinian Reconstruction and Development 
Plan (PRDP) by the PA in 2007, shifted much of their support away from civil society 
organisations towards support for the quasi-state. Consequently, programming tends 
to be reactive and short-term, typically six months to one year maximum: a trend 
exacerbated in 2009 by the conceptualisation of Gaza, following Operation Cast Lead, as 
a humanitarian emergency. The bulk of child protection interventions are funded through 
the Consolidated Appeals Process mechanism, which is a year-by-year fundraising 
activity. Nevertheless, Save the Children as the main international organisation focusing 
on all aspects of child protection runs some longer-term programmes. In the oPt Save 
the Children is represented by Save the Children UK (SCUK), Sweden (SCS), and the 
US (SCUS), with considerable funding from Save the Children Norway as well as the 
EC and ECHO. Over the years SCUK and SCS have stood out for their advocacy work, 
focusing on the violations of children’s rights arising from practices by Israel such as 
detention, forcible displacement, settler violence, house demolition and denial of access to 
basic services. Other children-focused INGOs, such as Terre des Hommes International 
and Terre des Hommes Italy, and War Child Holland, are largely focused on providing 
psychosocial support activities to children and adolescents; War Child also works in Israel. 
Other organisations deal with child protection as part of their education or health projects 
or programmes. 
Donors
For most, if not all, of the governmental and intergovernmental donors child protection 
represents an implicit aim of a larger strategy for the oPt relating to human rights, 
democracy, governance and the rule of law. The EU is the largest donor to the PA and 
the NGOs. It has worked in close collaboration with the Ministry of Education and 
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Higher Education (MoEHE) to ensure quality education for all children and youth, 
and is currently funding the SCUK Protective Sphere Project.61 The EU is also one of 
the main funders of UNRWA.62 It has recently announced the disbursement of €7m for 
food security and job creation to the most vulnerable populations in the West Bank, 
particularly those living in the Seam Zone between the Separation Fence / Wall and the 
1967 border, as well as in Area C generally.63 Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden 
together with Switzerland fund the Human Rights and Good Governance Secretariat 
at the NGO Development Centre.64 Recipients of funds through the Secretariat include 
DCI/PS, the leading Palestinian child rights organisation. The governments of Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK and USA all fund organisations to deliver psychosocial programming 
to children.65
The limitations of current child protection practice
A response-focused and disconnected approach
Commenting on a particular meeting of the Child Protection Working Group one of our 
interviewees – an expatriate working for an INGO – noted: 
What came out of that meeting was pretty much a combination of the SCUK and the 
UNICEF definitions, rather than something that was more organic. And a lot of it was a 
laundry list of the issues, which I think is a lot of how protection is conceptualised here, which 
is a laundry list of the problems.
This international agency staff member then proceeded to explain the division of the 
‘laundry list’ of child protection in terms of two overarching categories: ‘occupation-
related’ and ‘traditional’. Other interviewees noted the same division, sometimes using the 
terms ‘external’ and ‘internal’ to refer to those protection issues resulting from the actions 
of Israel and those that arise from within Palestinian society, respectively. Many of our 
interviewees spoke of the particular need to address ‘internal’ child protection issues in 
the form of violence, abuse and neglect in the immediate realm of home and school, in 
some cases claiming that these had been relatively ignored in comparison to the impacts of 
occupation. An alternative manner of conceptualising this dichotomy might be ‘structural’ 
versus ‘inter-personal’. 
Domestic abuse is clearly a universal problem which cannot be attributed to an oppressive 
political-economic environment alone. Nevertheless, social scientists are increasingly 
pointing to the link between severe socio-economic pressures and the level of care offered 
to children by their primary caregivers. As one recent study in the UK observed: ‘… 
people’s parenting practices can be severely compromised by a lack of assets, resources, 
choice and opportunities.’66 The connection between the conditions under which 
Palestinians are compelled to live and the levels of abuse commonly perceived to occur 
within the household was widely made by our interviewees. As one 12 year old girl in a 
village outside Nablus told us:
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Now if you experience the occupation, you have someone in prison or you don’t know where 
they are… you will feel angry, stressed, you feel you cannot protect yourself, that will affect 
how you respond to the environment around you. So if my dad who’s a taxi driver, if the 
soldiers take his ID or his driving licence, when he comes back home he will be angry and 
doesn’t want to listen to us. 
The breakdown of customary order at school is similarly understood as a partial product 
of the stresses of life under occupation. As one local NGO worker observed:
The teachers feel like they are losing control over their students. Especially in Hebron and 
other places where they have to cross checkpoints and they have to do it at the same time as 
their students they see that the teachers are being humiliated and so the students, they start 
losing respect for their teachers.67
Although the close connection between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ (or ‘structural’ and ‘inter-
personal’) factors in the production of risks for children is clearly understood, many 
child protection efforts did not appear to reflect this understanding in their design. This 
disconnection in practice is bound up with a dominant tendency to focus on response 
to threat rather than prevention. As we have indicated, the definition of child protection 
currently employed by UNICEF, Save the Children and other organisations highlights 
both. However, in the oPt we found that the focus was largely on the former, namely 
response. As one Palestinian working for a bilateral donor observed:
The impact of all this on our kids… I was talking to someone whose son was going to a school 
in Jerusalem. Every single day he had to cross the checkpoint and at the end he said: ‘Mama, 
I can’t take it anymore, that’s it.’ They start to hate school, hating you know. They’re going 
every day through this bizarre situation and again no one is looking at this and saying, ‘Ok, 
we should discuss it, how to tackle this.’ It’s as if our brains stopped to function. We work with 
symptoms, we do not work with causes. You know, when a child starts to wet the bed, when 
a woman starts to have headaches, or psychosomatic signs and symptoms, we should ask 
‘Why? What has changed?’ We should dig deep enough. 
In the oPt international and intergovernmental donor and programmatic organisations 
appear to give the lion’s share of their resources and attention to efforts intended to alleviate 
children’s suffering or to mediate the negative impact of violence. This is evidenced across 
the range of activities undertaken: with a strong focus on ensuring that particular spaces – 
notably the home, school and play space – provide nurturance and healing. 
Many organisations have been involved in psychosocial activities with children and their 
carers over many years, with additional efforts being made in the wake of particularly 
severe events such as Operation Cast Lead. A UN survey of local perceptions in the 
aftermath of this attack upon Gaza claimed that ‘psychosocial support is by far the most 
important need for children nowadays’.68 This finding was not informed by any interaction 
with children themselves and the survey itself did not allow for expression of needs 
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beyond the immediate such as for food, schooling, play space, etc.69 Removal of Israel’s 
blockade of Gaza was not a need that respondents were invited to identify. 
The oPt was estimated by several of our expatriate and local interviewees working for 
programmatic organisations to be amongst the world’s conflict zones with the highest 
presence of psychosocial interventions in relation to the size of the population. Much of 
the focus of such programming is upon coping and resilience: enabling children and their 
carers to deal with the extreme stress of life under occupation. The following quote taken 
from a recent agency document gives a sense of the approach:
An UNRWA programme running in 85 schools in Gaza provides weekly life skills classes with 
fun exercises and role play to help develop children’s skills at coping with trauma. ‘Conditions 
in Gaza are so overwhelming that it’s very difficult for children to live normal lives… we 
try to rehabilitate these children and teach them how to lead a normal life in abnormal 
conditions,’ explains the head of the programme.70
While such programmes may well have a valuable healing effect upon children’s lives 
they cannot be considered as preventative activities, except insofar as they help to reduce 
tensions within the home and school that could otherwise give rise to violence. They 
address the consequences of life under occupation but do not address the underlying 
causes of suffering. 
We would suggest that this de-linking of the structural (external / occupation-related) 
from the inter-personal (internal / traditional) and the concomitant focus upon 
response (effects) rather than prevention (causes) is a product of at least two possible 
factors. The first of these has already been noted: that is to say, the influence of a social 
work and mental health approach to child protection that currently dominates the 
field of child protection globally and which constrains the impact of local ideas and 
aspirations upon the design of interventions. The presence of such a large number of 
psychosocial activities – to the point where protection and psychosocial programming 
appeared almost synonymous for several of our interviewees71 – is not simply a response 
to the particular context of the oPt. Rather this reflects the significant influence of 
scholars and practitioners from public health backgrounds in North American and 
European institutions upon current global understanding of child protection. While 
this understanding certainly extends beyond a narrow focus upon mental wellbeing to 
embrace children as socio-cultural and material beings, it nevertheless commonly fails to 
move beyond an individualistic and de-politicised orientation.72 In the Palestinian context 
this is evidenced in the focus upon the resilience of individuals and their immediate 
families whilst the demonstrably vital dimension of collective resilience – with its 
inherently political implications – is downplayed.73
The second possible factor accounting for the disconnected, response-focused approach 
that prevails relates to the political context. On one hand, there are child protection 
workers who express the view that it is better to do something to ameliorate the situation, 
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even in a small way, than continue to expend resources in a futile attempt to address 
the political causes of threat. One NGO worker described the current programming 
environment as follows:
It’s mitigation right? We are in a mitigation phase. We’re not going anywhere, except trying 
to stay in the same place. So while we’re not in control of the future political agenda, we can 
definitely try to, you know, help people not just lose it. Do you know the levels of Prozac and 
the depression levels and whatever? 
On the other hand, we could clearly discern the influence of donor governments and the 
contraints that arise due to issues of policy shaped, ultimately, by political considerations. 
We return to this point below. However, suffice it to say here, that the focus on mental 
health and similiarly ameliorative measures is not politically neutral.
Institutional constraints
The early 1980s witnessed the emergence of a new generation of activists in the oPt. 
Largely urban and middle class, they mobilised a mass movement based on grassroots 
voluntary activism and operating under the institutional umbrella of the PLO.74 Numerous 
Palestinian NGOs were established, providing the structure for the formation of popular 
committees, trade unions, student unions and women’s committees, running in parallel 
with the already existing web of charitable and Islamic networks.75 These organisations 
often played a significant role in fields such as health, education, agriculture and several 
focused specifically on women. They also played a central role in the resistance to Israeli 
occupation, combining activism with material support and delivery of services. While 
Arab governments offered intermittent finance, western funding mostly came from 
small non-governmental organisations operating on the basis of solidarity. Over time, 
and particularly following the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian NGOs became increasingly 
professionalised. The involvement of western bilateral and multi-lateral donors grew 
and with that came the imposition of standardised bureaucratic practices upon local 
NGOs and a focus upon technical expertise and bureaucratic competence.76 One result 
of this gradual shift away from activism and solidarity has been to distance Palestinians 
working for local NGOs from the grassroots in terms of agenda-setting and prioritisation. 
A Palestinian working at a local child-focused NGO commented upon this shift in the 
following terms:
I shouldn’t say this, but I think international organisations are trying to shut us up. In the 
past locals were out on the streets, now we’re in the offices.
Within the oPt, the relationship between local NGOs, on one hand, and UN and 
international organisations, on the other, is discussed in terms of ‘partnership’. Such 
terminology can be deceptive given the clear hierarchies of power – financial, institutional 
and political – that place local organisations in a subordinate position as a matter 
of course. Since this is an issue of global relevance pertaining to development and 
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humanitarian work generally we shall focus here only upon the specific implications of 
such hierarchical relations for the protection of Palestinian children.77
Instigated for the purposes of improving co-ordination, the cluster approach also 
reinforces a familiar hierarchy according to which UNICEF is positioned at the apex. 
In effect this co-ordinating responsibility gives UNICEF a leading role in defining 
priorities. As a recent evaluation of the cluster approach in the oPt noted, ‘accountability 
mechanisms towards beneficiaries are weak or non-existent…. Promotion of participatory 
approaches in the clusters… is very weak.’78 These observations echoed concerns about 
the CPWG arising from our interviews. Certainly, we could not discover any process to 
capture local views and feed these into the development of concepts, aims and methods 
of child protection efforts by UN and international organisations. Yet, our interviews with 
Palestinians revealed a range of aspirations and understandings around child protection 
often at considerable odds with the currently dominant global approach. For example, 
the priority being given by UNICEF to create a referral network for individual children 
considered at risk – a familiar element of child protection programming in Europe or 
North America – assumed an individualistic, case-focused understanding that sat uneasily 
with the aspiration of Palestinians that we interviewed for the protection of children 
(especially boys) as social actors requiring freedom of movement and association for their 
proper development into autonomous adults. 
Furthermore, there was a consistent frustration expressed with the perceived lack of 
willingness by international organisations in general, and UNICEF in particular, to take 
a clear stand in response to violations. As one interviewee commented: ‘The problem is 
from the donors, they want us to ignore the problems and look at superficial wounds, 
superficial issues, that’s what UNICEF is doing.’ There clearly exists an expectation 
that this organisation should be seen to challenge Israel’s violations directly. Such 
action is arguably inherent to the rights-based approach that UNICEF has committed 
itself to pursue globally.79 The fact that UNICEF has, in the perception of many of our 
interviewees, failed to do so, is seen as particularly problematic given this organisation’s 
leading role for child protection in the oPt.
For their own part, UNICEF staff noted that they make continuous effort to gather and 
pass on information about violations by Israel:
I do hear organizations saying, ‘oh the UN isn’t doing anything about it’. At the end of the 
day it is the Security Council. And believe me we do bombard them with information…. I see 
an advocacy strategy means complementing each other…. So there are some things we can do 
together [with the NGOs] and when we can, we will, and where we can’t, I think we have to 
go with other strengths. But at the end of the day we have mechanisms, such as the Security 
Council where we can only do our best to lobby. 
Certainly, UNICEF’s recent work in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1612 
represents a significant step forward in terms of systematising the monitoring and 
2 9    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
reporting of Israel’s violations, for which they deserve credit. From interviews and from 
the evidence of actions undertaken UNICEF appears to prefer the kind of witnessing and 
reporting role entailed in the 1612 Working Group, and reporting through internal UN 
mechanisms, to one of public advocacy. Expatriate and local interviewees cited examples 
of situations when UNICEF had chosen not to join other child-focused agencies in 
an advocacy initiative, sometimes after extensive deliberation that caused delay to the 
initative itself. Political considerations – discussed below – are undoubtedly involved in 
this reticence, compounded by the need to defer on advocacy matters to the Humanitarian 
Co-ordinator and by varying degrees of timidity on the part of staff in the Jerusalem office. 
UNICEF also exists in a complex relationship to the State of Israel as occupying force and 
arguably risks being expelled were it to embarrass the government too greatly. Nevertheless, 
the muted role played by UNICEF has at least three negative consequences. Firstly it causes 
considerable frustration amongst colleagues in fellow organisations. Secondly, it alienates 
many ordinary Palestinians who, above all, expect organisations of such high profile to 
take a public stand in defence of international law and the principles, such as children’s 
rights, that they espouse. Finally, by adopting a primarily behind-the-scenes appraoch, the 
opportunity is lost for UNICEF to use its global profile and considerable authority to raise 
public awareness about Israel’s treatment of Palestinian children. 
The role of the donors
Focus on the PA
A large share of the donor community’s efforts in the oPt have gone into support for the 
development of the PA. This is particularly the case for donors such as DfID and the EU 
which barely offer any meaningful support to civil society organisations. The underlying 
assumption behind such efforts is that a well functioning state apparatus will help to 
ensure the protection and wellbeing of the Palestinian population, including children. 
However, there are serious problems with this approach. Firstly, and most obviously, the 
PA is not a national government since the State of Palestine does not exist. Moreover, 
the ability of the PA to function as a quasi-state authority is consistently undermined by 
Israel which has appropriated land and imposed a matrix of control in such a manner 
that the most basic element of a nation-state – territorial integrity – is denied. Indeed, the 
PA in the West Bank is prevented from working in East Jerusalem and Area ‘C’ and the 
Hamas-led government in Gaza is, in any case, completely shunned by the international 
community. Therefore, the Palestinian quasi-state authorities have no possibility to 
promote the protection of millions of children. In the words of an official from the PA:
We’ve said across the board ‘we’d rather you support us to get access and movement. Don’t 
give us any development funds. If you can resolve with the Israelis access and movement and 
sovereignty issues we don’t need a penny of development assistance: we’ll do the rest on our 
own.’ And the donors say ‘Sorry, we just can’t do that’. 
One response to the absence of territorial integrity and lack of access and secure 
movement has been to localise services, including those most needed by children. This 
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is partly a response to understandable demands from villagers and the residents of small 
towns anxious or constrained – due to physical or economic restrictions – to send their 
children to schools and health facilities at a distance from their immediate locale. In recent 
years the field of international development has nurtured an ethos of community-focused, 
grassroots initiatives. Thus, within the oPt UN and international organisations are already 
disposed towards the localisation of services. Yet, in responding positively to requests for a 
local primary school or village-based primary health clinic they are effectively supporting 
the enclavisation of the oPt according to the logic of the Israeli government. A Palestinian 
interviewee observed:
A lot of resources are being put into developing isolated programming simply because the 
donors don’t challenge Israel on allowing children to travel to different places. The donors will 
fund the Palestinians to build two or three additional classrooms rather than building one 
school in a central locality where everyone can come. We’ll say ‘it’s cheaper just to buy a bus 
and to use the bus’. And they’ll say ‘no, we can’t guarantee that the bus is going to go’.
Clearly there is a tension between the immediate goal of providing basic services under 
conditions of imposed immobility and the long-term goal of ensuring the territorial 
integrity of any future Palestinian state. However, this tension could be seen as a product 
of the inaccurate conceptualisation of the setting as a mix of humanitarian emergency 
and international development. If the challenge for the international community were 
reframed as, first and foremost, one of ensuring that principles of human rights and 
international law are upheld, then this tension becomes irrelevant. 
Political will
On the ground, we found little evidence to suggest that the donors are committed to 
calling Israel to account over its actions that violate Palestinian children’s protection. 
As one UN agency worker observed: ‘We will be able to ensure protection once donors 
and the political process decide to engage the Israelis, to hold them accountable to their 
obligations’, thereby indicating that this is currently not the case. We found few donors 
specifically engaged in support of child protection efforts and, of these, most seemed 
to focus largely on funding for psychosocial programmes, as noted above. Certainly, a 
principled approach to Palestinian children’s protection – based upon IHL and IHRL – 
was not on the agenda of most of the nine bilateral and multi-lateral donor organisations 
that met with us. As one interviewee – a Palestinian health professional – commented 
wryly: ‘I think the donors would stop funding if it was really about child rights, because 
the most obvious ones are about occupation and access and all of that.’
It should not be inferred, however, that donor staff are unaware or unconcerned about the 
situation. A Palestinian academic made the following observation:
It’s a political protection. I mean everyone knows this, even donors, I never met a donor 
who doesn’t know this. But they are constrained. All of them would talk off the record. They 
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all are constrained. They all understand the imbalance of power that is the source of all the 
problems… but they have their jobs, they work within their mandates.
The issue, therefore, is the mandate within which donor agency staff on the ground are 
obliged to work which, it was consistently argued to us, reflects the interests of the US 
and Israel. The close and dependent relationship of most child protection organisations 
to major western governments, means that their work is constrained accordingly. For 
example, the alleged reluctance of UNICEF to take a public stand in challenging Israel’s 
violations as a signatory to the UNCRC and other international legal instruments was 
attributed by several interviewees primarily to fear of alienating funders as well as those 
with political influence in the US, where the pro-Israel lobby is immense powerful.80 Such 
concerns seemed especially justified in the summer of 2009, given that Ann Veneman, 
the Executive Director of UNICEF at that time, was a political appointee of President 
George W. Bush. A former senior official in the US government – which has maintained 
its refusal to sign and ratify the UNCRC – Veneman personally displayed a highly 
ambivalent attitude towards rights-based programming during her time at the helm of this 
organisation. On the ground, the constraints from headquarters in New York were clearly 
felt. As one former UNICEF oPt employee recalled:
We had more pressure on what we could say about violations of children’s rights from New 
York than even from the Israeli government.
Interviewees also raised questions about the restrictions upon SCUS, which is the largest 
member of Save the Children globally and in the oPt, and the only one not to pursue an 
explicitly rights-based approach. Its heavy reliance upon funding from USAID makes it 
vulnerable to pressure to act in accordance with the US foreign policy agenda. A former 
member of the Middle East and North Africa team at SCUK observed that ‘SCUS didn’t 
have the room to do anything independent (of government) if it wanted to support the 
numbers of staff dependent on government-funded operations.’ The political influence 
from the US government is apparently not limited to SCUS alone but can affect the 
actions of other SC organisations as well. According to another interviewee with lengthy 
experience of work for SCUK at a senior level: 
[SCUS] were trying to push for a line that nobody must do anything that harms a member 
agency’s interests. And if it displeased friends in Congress that was reason enough for them to 
try and veto anything we might be doing.81
The influence of the US government on SCUS activity in the oPt is apparent at a very 
immediate level: rather than referring to the ‘occupied Palestinian territory’, SCUS follows 
USAID in using the term ‘West Bank and Gaza’. In this way they eschew reference to 
occupation, ignore Israel’s illegal annexation of East Jerusalem and diverge from the 
United Nations Security Council, the International Committee of the Red Cross and most 
organisations working on the ground. 
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Under the influence of Headquarters, advocacy appears to be an aspect of child protection 
work that SCUS in the oPt do not embrace. As one former employee of SCUK recalled: 
While writing that report with other members of Save the Children on disabled children and 
access to education the local SCUS representative was very supportive. But the message from 
Westport [SCUS HQ] was clearly ‘no advocacy on Palestine publicly please’.
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 Conclusion and recommendations
Conclusion
Comparing the actions to protect Palestinian children in 2009 to the example of Eglantyne 
Jebb and her efforts to address the starvation and death of Austrian and German children 
in the wake of World War I is revealing. In place of Jebb’s determination to address the 
political causes of suffering we witnessed an overwhelming tendency to focus upon effects. 
Were the dominant approach in the oPt to have been implemented in post-war Europe it 
would arguably have entailed working around the British blockade in order to distribute 
rations to Austrian and German children rather than challenging the blockade itself. 
We have identified a number of constraints upon the pursuit by the international 
community of a principled approach to children’s protection. These include issues 
inherent to the current orthodoxy within the field of child protection globally – such as 
the primacy given to technical competence over analytical skills and detailed contextual 
knowledge, and an approach overly informed by social work and mental health models. 
To this we could also add the specific problems arising from standardised thinking about 
humanitarian emergencies in armed conflict that fails to address the specific challenges 
of occupation and long-term political violence. We have also alluded to some of the 
constraints created by institutional dynamics on the ground, including the hierarchy that 
exists amongst UN, international and local agencies which appears to be reinforced by the 
cluster approach. 
Ultimately, however, the greatest challenge lies in the realm of politics. This is for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the scale of obstacles to overcome is immense given the tendency 
of influential western governments to prioritise their good relations with the State of 
Israel over the rights of the Palestinians as contained in IHL and IHRL. Secondly, political 
considerations bear directly upon the conceptualisation of child protection and the 
institutional dynamics of organisations working in the oPt. Many of the shortcomings 
of international and UN child protection efforts flow from the insistence on relating 
to the setting as one of ‘conflict’ between two more or less equal adversaries in which a 
changing combination of developmental and humanitarian interventions is required. A 
more appropriate characterisation would be of a chronic and long-term human rights 
and protection crisis arising from Israel’s occupation and the systematic appropriation of 
Palestiian land and resources. 
Our research made it quite clear that the protection of Palestinian children cannot 
be achieved without political action. Humanitarian aid and development assistance – 
conventionally pursued – cannot constitute a counter to mass and systematic violations 
of IHL and IHRL. However, there is little evidence that major donors such as the EU, the 
governments of the UK and US, are prepared to take the kind of action at the political 
level that is required. The following observation by Michael Aaronson – former Director 
General of SCUK – accurately captures the situation in the oPt where agencies seeking to 
ensure the protection of Palestinian children are constrained by governmental donors that 
are not willing or do not have the capability or will to take the action necessary: 
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We believe we can use ‘humanitarian’ or ‘development’ assistance to help us achieve our 
objectives, but in reality we are back to where we were at the end of the 1980s, where we relied 
on humanitarian action as a substitute for effective political action. So we stagger in Iraq, 
look decidedly shaky in Afghanistan, are impotent in Darfur, and apparently do very little in 
Palestine. Something is fundamentally wrong with our model.82
In such a fraught environment, it is no small task to identify steps that might be taken 
which will significantly improve the efforts of international and UN organisations to 
protect Palestinian children. Due to the complex and inter-related nature of the challenges, 
a concerted and multi-level approach is essential. Moreover, meaningful steps necessitate 
significant change which many organisations will be reluctant to undertake, especially if 
these appear to jeopardise funding sources. Ultimately, however, it is not only the lives of 
Palestinian children that are at stake. The failure to protect Palestinian children over many 
years raises questions about the integrity of organisations that proclaim the principles of 
human and child rights and the primacy of children’s protection over national interests, 
yet invest their energies in activities that appear largely ameliorative in nature: intended 
to increase the capacity of Palestinian children and their families to cope better and 
longer with Israeli violations. This is clearly far less than Palestinians would expect 
and the patience of many that we interviewed has long since worn thin. As one of our 
interviewees, an employee of a local NGO, expressed it:
Listen, we are expert now. You funded us so much that we are experts and professionals, 
as you said. And this is our solution: our solution is human rights. If it conforms to your 
standards, support us. If it doesn’t, goodbye. 
Recommendations
INGOs and UN agencies
The understanding of child protection should be developed through the following actions:•	
 -  reassertion of the principles of child protection derived from IHL and IHRL, and 
evidenced in the work of Eglantyne Jebb, founder of Save the Children;
 -  engagement with Palestinian children and their caregivers about their experiences, 
understanding and aspirations around protection (i.e. not a tick-box survey of pre-
determined issues);
 -  co-analysis by Palestinian, international and intergovernmental organisations to reach 
a consensual understanding that embraces local experience and aspiration as well as 
(i) international legal standards (IHL and IHRL); (ii) current global thinking on child 
protection; (iii) the means of achieving prevention as well as response. 
In developing a locally meaningful understanding of child protection the following •	
issues should be considered: 
 -  the risks to children arising from occupation and appropriation of land and resources 
(rather than generic armed conflict); 
 -  the need for security of children’s movement and access as well as of their space.
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A wider array of expertise – in addition to mental health and social work – should be •	
drawn upon in the analysis and development of child protection measures. In particular, 
expertise in the Palestinian context from international relations, anthropological and 
political-economy perspectives should be utilized. 
A mechanism is needed to ensure that the CPWG functions in an accountable, •	
egalitarian and inclusive manner. 
Advocacy and awareness-raising measures should be pursued in a more concerted way •	
involving headquarters staff and partner organisations in Europe, North America and 
across the Arab World. The aim of such efforts should be to influence public opinion 
and build the political will for donor governments to pursue a principled approach to 
child protection in the oPt. 
The potential to address the illegality of Israel’s actions should be explored in other •	
countries, for example by highlighting the link between the settlement produce 
exported to Europe and the harm inflicted upon Palestinian children by settlers and 
their appropriation of land and natural resources.
Funding sources should be reviewed from the perspective of ensuring maximum •	
potential to pursue a principled approach to children’s protection. Organisations that 
seek to be identified as part of civil society should consider carefully the implications of 
accepting large funds from highly restrictive donors such as USAID. 
The work of child protection organisations should be evaluated in terms of their impact in •	
mitigating and preventing harm to Palestinian children arising from political violence – 
especially the effects of occupation-related violence – according to clear principles of 
IHL and IHRL; Conversely, the unwillingness to go beyond ameliorative measures – 
such as psychosocial interventions – should become the focus of critical discussion. 
Donors
The current characterisation of the context of the oPt as one of development and •	
state-building with elements of humanitarian aid should be re-examined: serious 
consideration should be given to framing the oPt as a long-term human rights and 
protection crisis requiring both a principled approach by donors and their engagement 
in political action to enforce adherence to agreed international norms and laws; a focus 
on root causes rather than effects is essential. 
The rights of children as members of a Palestinian national community should also be •	
addressed; this should include a focus on adherence to the aim and principles of self-
determination.
Donors should consider the extent of their independence from the political agenda of the •	
United States and thus from the pro-Israel lobby that significantly shapes that agenda.
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The protection of Palestinian children should be made a primary consideration of •	
the donors: recipients should be evaluated in terms of their capacity to implement a 
principled approach to children’s protection that not only mitigates the impact of harm 
but seeks to prevent this from occuring through efforts at advocacy. Furthermore, there 
should be a coherent approach to funding that ensures advocacy efforts are concerted 
and achieve maximum impact locally and globally. 
In light of concerns to ensure the maximum positive impact upon children’s protection, •	
the shift of funds away from civil society by donors, most notably by DfID, should be 
re-evaluated urgently.
There should be greater support and encouragement for efforts to monitor Israeli •	
insititutions in which Palestinian children’s rights are regularly violated, such as courts, 
prisons, and police stations.
Donors should focus more concertedly on the situation of children in East Jerusalem •	
and Area ‘C’ (under full Israeli control), supporting recipient organisations to gain 
access and challenging Israeli restrictions on the basis of international law.
3 7    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
 Bibliography
Aaronson, M. (2007) ‘A Holistic Approach to the War on Terror?’ Geneva: Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue
Alkire S. (2002) ‘Conceptual Framework for Human Security’, Commission on Human 
Security Working Paper
Batniji, R., Rabaia, Y., Nguyen-Gilham, V., Giacaman, R., Sarraj, E., Punamäki, R.-L., Saab, 
H. and Boyce, W. (2009) ‘Health as Human Security in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ 
The Lancet 373 (9669) 1133–1144 28th March
Beinin, J. (2007) ‘Letter from al-Tuwani’ MERIP no. 244 www.merip.org/mer/mer244/
beinin_tuwani.html accessed 12.2.10
Brynen, R. (2000) A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West 
Bank and Gaza, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press
Challand (2009) Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign Donors and the Power to Promote and 
Exclude, London: Routledge
Coomaraswamy, R. (2008) Annual Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy A/HRC/9/3 27 June 
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/9session/reports.htm, accessed 14.8.10
Cox, F. (2001) ‘New Humanitarianism: Does it Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st 
Century?’ Disasters 25(4): 275–289 
Craissati, D. (2005) ‘New NGOs and Democratic Governance in Palestine: A Pioneering 
Model for the Arab World?’ in Ben Nefissa, S., Abd Al-Fattah, N., Hanafi, S. and Milani, C. 
(eds), NGOs and Governance in the Arab World, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press
DCI/PS (2005) Surviving the Present, Facing the Future: An Analysis of Human Rights 
Violations Against Palestinian Children 2004, Ramallah: Defence for Children International 
/ Palestine Section
DCI/PS (2008) Under Attack: Settler Violence Against Palestinian Children in the Occupied 
Territory, Ramallah: Defence for Children International / Palestine Section
DCI/PS (2009) Bearing the Brunt Again: Child Rights Violations during Operation Cast 
Lead, Ramallah: Defence for Children International / Palestine Section 
De Soto, A. (2007) ‘End of Mission Report’ http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/
Guardian/documents/2007/06/12/DeSotoReport.pdf
Halper, J. (2000) ‘The 94 Percent Solution: A Matrix of Control’, Middle East Report, 216, Fall
3 8    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
Hanafi, S. and Tabar, L. (2005) The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite: Donors, 
International Organizations and Local NGOs, Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies and 
Muwatin
Hart, J., Paludan, M. B., Steffen, L. and O’Donaghue, G. (2011) ‘Working with Children as 
Stakeholders in Development: The Challenges of Organisational Change’ Development in 
Practice 20 (3)
Hever, S. (2008) ‘Political Economy of Aid to Palestinians under Occupation’, The Economy 
of the Occupation. A Socio-economic Bulletin, 17–18, The Alternative Information Centre 
(AIC), November
Hilal, J. and Khan, M. (2004) ‘State Formation under the PA’ in Khan, M. (ed.) State 
Formation in Palestine: Viability and Governance during a Social Transformation, London: 
Routledge
Institute of Community and Public Health Birzeit University and Palestinian Authority, 
National Plan of Action Secretariat (2006) Child Protection in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory: Structures, Policies and Services, Ramallah: Ministry of Planning and Birzeit 
University
Jonsson, U. (2003) A Human Rights Approach to Development Programming, Nairobi: 
UNICEF-ESARO
Kruger, S. and Steets, S. (2010) ‘IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, 2nd Phase, Country 
Study: The Occupied Palestinian Territory’, Groupe URD and Global Public Policy Institute
Le More, A. (2008) International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo, London: Routledge
Lipman, J. (2010) ‘Obama: “Unwavering” on Israel’s Security’ Jewish Chronicle July 7  
www.thejc.com/news/israel-news/33987/obama-unwavering-israels-security, accessed 10.7.10
Machel, G. (1996) Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, New York: United Nations and 
UNICEF
Maguire, K. (2003) ‘How British Charity was Silenced on Iraq’, The Guardian Friday 28 
November
Mansour, S. (1996) ‘The Intifada Generation in the Classroom’ Prospects 978(2): 293–310
Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. (2007) The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, New York: 
Farrar, Straus & Giroux
3 9    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
Mulley, C. (2009) The Woman Who Saved the Children: A Biography of Eglantyne Jebb, 
Founder of Save the Children, Oxford: One World Publications
Nguyen-Gillham, V., Giacaman, R., Naser, G. and Boyce, W. (2007) ‘Normalising the 
Abnormal: Palestinian Youth and the Contradictions of Resilience in Protracted Conflict’ 
Health and Social Care in the Community 16(3), 291–298
Nylund, B. V. and Hyllested, I. (2010) ‘Protecting Children Affected by Armed Conflict: 
Accountability for Monitoring, Reporting, and Response’ Journal of Human Rights Practice 
2(1): 71–92
OCHA (2009) Five years after the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion. A 
Summary of the Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier, Jerusalem: OCHA
OCHA (2010) Consolidated Appeals Process, Jerusalem: OCHA
Palestinian Hydrology Group (2006a) Water for Life: Continued Israeli Assault on 
Palestinian Water, Sanitation and Hygiene During the Intifada, Ramallah: PHG
Palestinian Hydrology Group (2006b) Water for Life: The Dilemma of Development under 
Occupation, Ramallah: PHG
Qumsieh, V. (1999) ‘The Environmental Impact of Jewish Settlements in the West Bank’ 
Palestine-Israel Journal 5(1)
Ridge, T. (2009) Living with Poverty: A Review of Children’s and Families’ Experience of 
Poverty, UK Department for Work and Pensions: Research Report No. 594
Save the Children (2007) Child Protection in Emergencies, London: International Save the 
Children Alliance
Sayigh, Y. (2007) ‘Inducing a Failed State in Palestine’, Survival, 49: 3, Autumn
Secretariat of the National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children (2005a) General List of 
Child Protection Services, Ramallah: Ministry of Planning
Secretariat of the National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children (2005b) Child 
Protection in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A National Position Paper, Ramallah: 
Ministry of Planning
Taraki, L. (2006) ‘Introduction’ to Taraki, L. (ed.) Living Palestine: Family Survival, 
Resistance, and Mobility under Occupation, Syracuse University Press
Thomas, A. (2008) The Zoo on the Road to Nablus, Philadelphia: Public Affairs
4 0    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
Trojan, V. (2008), Child Rights Situation Analysis: Right to Protection in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory – 2008, Ramallah/Jerusalem: DCI/PS and Save the Children Sweden
UNDP (2006) Human Development Report. Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global 
Water Crisis, New York: UNDP
UNDP (2009) Inside Gaza: Attitudes and Perceptions of the Gaza Strip Residents in the 
Aftermath of the Israeli Military Operations, Jerusalem: UNDP
UNDP (2010) Human Development Report 2009/10: Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Jerusalem: UNDP
UNHCR (2008) Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls, First Edition, Geneva: 
UNHCR
UNICEF (2006) Child Protection Information Sheet. What is Child Protection? New York: 
UNICEF
UNICEF (2009a) Machel 10 Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing 
World, New York: UNICEF
UNICEF (2009b) ‘Terms of Reference for Child Protection Sector Working Group, 4th 
Draft’, Jerusalem: oPt Child Protection Sector Working Group
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict (2009) Checklist to Identify the Special Needs and 
Vulnerabilities of Displaced Children, New York: Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict
Weir, A. (2004) ‘Heroism in the Holy Land: Americans Beaten for Walking Children to 
School’ Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs December
Woodhead, M. (1997) ‘Psychology and the Cultural Construction of Children’s Needs’ in 
James, A. and Prout, A. (eds) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood, London: The 
Falmer Press
Zertal, I. and Eldar, A. (2005) Lords of the Land: The War Over Israel’s Settlements in the 
Occupied Territories, 1967–2007, New York: Nation Books
4 1    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
 Endnotes
1.  Hever 2008: 5.
2.  See statement by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/OPAC/ISR/CO/1 29 Jan. 2010 p.4,  
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/CRC-C-OPAC-ISR-CO-1.pdf retrieved 17.12.10.
3.  Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Negotiation Affairs Department, Palestinian Refugees – Factsheet,  
www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=facts_refugees_faq2p retrieved 21.1.10.
4.  Sinai was returned to Egypt in stages following a peace agreement signed in 1979. Consideration of the situation of 
non-Jewish children in the Israeli-occupied Golan is beyond the scope of this paper. 
5.  Israel withdrew its forces and settlers unilaterally from Gaza in 2005. However, it has maintained its blockade of the 
territory and control over the movement of the Palestinian population out of the Strip by land, sea and air. 
6.  Hanafi and Tabar 2005: 64.
7.  Al Haq, the leading human rights NGO in the oPt, was established in 1979 as an offshoot of the International 
Commission of Jurists.
8.  Under the Oslo Accords, Israel, led by Prime Minister Rabin, officially recognised the PLO, led by Chairman Arafat, as 
its negotiation counterpart, but made no other commitments. The PLO recognised Israel’s right to live in peace and 
security and renounced violence and terrorism. The Accords also provided for the creation of a Palestinian National 
Authority (PA) which would have responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control.
9.  Le More explains how institution building was considered the first step to the final two-state solution. In 1999, the 
EU which had in 1980 given support to Palestinian claims for self-determination, formally endorsed the two-state 
solution. On 24 June 2002 President Bush offered US formal endorsement with his famous policy speech envisioning 
‘two states living side by side in peace and security’, which formed the basis for the Quartet’s Road Map for Peace. 
This certainly influenced the way donors perceived the relevance and the priority given to institution-building but 
also, as the position of the EU shows, crystallised the end of solidarity funding (2008: 160). 
10.  With Oslo II, in 1995, the PA was given responsibility for seven more autonomous Palestinian areas, known 
collectively as ‘Area A’. In Area A, which entails the land around the main cities (17% of the oPt) the PA retains full 
civil and security control; Area B involves a mix of PA and Israeli security control but full Israeli administration and it 
includes the main village lands (24% of the whole oPt). In Area C (60% of the oPt), the Israeli army holds full control 
over people and resources. This includes all the Jewish settlements. Here the PA can deliver services to its population 
but has no administrative control whatsoever. So for example, the PA cannot build any service infrastructure, such as 
schools, hospitals, water or electricity systems.
11.  This was decided with the Paris Protocols, the economic leg of the peace process. Remittances accounted for 60% of 
Palestinian revenues. Hilal and Khan note that up until the beginning of the second Intifada, Israel paid part of these 
revenues into bank accounts established outside the Palestinian Ministry of Finance and controlled by Arafat, his 
financial advisor and other signatories, with full knowledge of the donors. This situation, they conclude, was clearly 
beneficial for both sides: the Israelis could exert substantial leverage on their enemy with this card, whilst Arafat 
could re-distribute the revenues in unaccountable clientelistic ways to secure political stabiliity and the re-activation 
of the PLO, should the Peace Process collapse (2004: 81). 
12.  Halper 2000: 15.
13.  According to B’tselem, in the period 1996-2000 alone, the West Bank settler population rose from 139,974 people 
to 190,206. See Population by Year in West Bank Settlement, www.btselem.org/english/Settlements/Index.asp 
retrieved 12.5.10.
14.  Brynen 2000: 127. 
15.  Le More 2008: 14.
16.  Sayigh 2007: 7.
17.  All data, Le More 2008: 61.
18.  Le More 2008: 50.
19.  OCHA 2009: 8.
4 2    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
20.  OCHA 2009: 16.
21.  International Court of Justice, ‘Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory’, Press Release, The Hague, 9 July 2004 www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=71andcode=mwpandp1=3a
ndp2=4andp3=6andcase=131andk=5a accessed 13.12.09.
22.  BBC News, ‘Palestinians Shun Israeli Settlement Restriction Plan’, 25 November 2009 http: //news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/8379868.stm accessed 17.12.09.
23.  De Soto, 2007:19
24.  See DCI/PS Report, Bearing the Brunt Again: Child Rights Violations during Operation Cast Lead, Ramallah, 
September 2009, retrieved at: www.dci-pal.org/english/publ/research/BearingTheBruntAgain.pdf and DCI/PS press 
release on Operation Warm Winter, ‘Gaza Death Toll Rises to 33 Children’, as of 6 March 2008, retrieved at:  
www.dci-pal.org/english/display.cfm?DocId=696andCategoryId=16. 
25.  OCHA 2010: 1.
26.  UNICEF 2006.
27.  See Woodhead 1997.
28.  See for example Save the Children 2007; UNHCR 2008; Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict 2009.
29.  Mulley 2009: 245.
30.  Ibid: 233.
31.  Ibid: 309.
32.  This principle has arguably been strengthened in recent years by the emergence of the human security paradigm 
which promotes the right of populations to basic protection over considerations of national sovereignty, see Alkire 
2002: 2.; Batniji et al. 2009; UNDP 2010.
33.  Mulley 2009: 249.
34.  Jonsson 2003: 20.
35.  Cox 2001: 275.
36.  See, for example, Lipman 2010.
37.  Taraki 2006: xxx.
38.  De Soto 2007: 32.
39.  Information and statistics on actions by the Israeli military authorities are compiled by various organisations. For 
statistics on children see the website of DCI/PS www.dci-pal.org. Israeli human rights organization, Be’Tselem 
compiles information on issues that include Israel’s use of administrative detention, destruction of property and 
restrictions on movement: see www.btselem.org.  Palestinian human rights organization, Al Haq, produces quarterly 
field reports on human rights violations in the oPt by both Israel and the PA www.alhaq.org. These reports include 
accounts of specific incidents, such as shootings of civilians by the IDF.
40.  In the Machel Study 10 year Strategic Review (UNICEF 2009a: 23) a 12 year old Palestinian girl is similarly quoted 
as saying ‘For the time being, there are many violent attacks that may happen at any time. Some of us may die in the 
street or in school or even at home, which means no safety for anyone at any time.’
41.  From interviews with residents of Azzoun and relevant agency staff. See also www.palestinemonitor.org/spip/spip.
php?article313 accessed 21.4.10.
42.  Point made or confirmed by several interviewees working for multilateral organisations. 
43.  For maps showing the latest situation on the ground – including the route of Israel’s Fence / Wall see the website of 
OCHA oPt www.ochaopt.org/generalmaps.aspx?id=96
44.  Secretariat of the National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children 2005b: 29–30.
4 3    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
45.  In the summer of 2009 various obstacles to movement within the West Bank were being eased. This included, for 
example, removal of a number of checkpoints that had severely hindered travel. While parents in Nablus told us that 
they welcomed these changes, none appeared confident that this signalled a long-term improvement. Rather, they 
were convinced that the checkpoints could be re-imposed at any time and so remained anxious about travel by their 
children beyond the city.
46.  For a detailed account of this zoo see Thomas 2008.
47.  Palestinian Hydrology Group 2006a: 18-20.
48.  2006 figures cited by the Palestinian Hydrology Group. The figures for settlers have not been made available by 
Israel since 1997. Palestinian Hydrology Group 2006b: 53.
49.  UNDP 2006: 116–117; see also DCI/PS 2005: 43-47.
50.  See Qumsieh 1999; also www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/waste-smuggled-across-the-green-line-drops-
by-80-1.248806 accessed 21.7.10.
51.  All information on the Cluster System and the Humanitarian Reform can be found on the official webpage www.
humanitarianreform.org. 
52.  OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, CAP occupied Palestinian territory 2009, table D, Requirements, Commitments/
Contributions and Pledges per Sector, as of 4 December 2009, retrieved at: http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/reports/daily/
ocha_R3sum_A834___0912041513.pdf.
53.  Nylund and Hyllested 2010. 
54.  In addition to the Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV, 1949) and the UNCRC (1989), state responsibility for the 
protection of children is covered by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966), and the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT, 1984)
55.  See for example an analysis of the juvenile justice sector and the efforts to introduce a juvenile justice bill in Trojan 
2008: 39 onwards. This report explains how politics have hindered the drafting process of the new juvenile justice 
bill, stalled since 1999.
56.  See for example, Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University, and Palestinian Authority, National Plan 
of Action Secretariat 2006. Interview with Vanina Trojan, Consultant for DCI / PS and Save the Children Sweden, 
Ramallah, 17 March 2009.
57.  Secretariat of the National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children 2005a.
58.  Israel is a state party to the GCIV (but only to the third of its three additional protocols), to the ICPPR, the ICESCR, 
the CAT, as well as to the UNCRC and the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
(2000). Together these define the legal obligations of Israel as occupying power towards Palestinian children.
59.  UNICEF 2009b: 1. 
60.  Interview with M. Brailsford, Senior Protection Officer, UNRWA, Jerusalem 03/08/2009.
61.  ECTAO, PEGASE: Investing in people. Improving the provision of educational and healthcare services, 2009, retrieved 
at: www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu/en/cooperatio_development/pdf_sec/social.pdf. 
62.  ECHO, Aid in Action, http: //ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/north_africa_mid_east/palestinian_en.htm. 
63.  See, ECHO website, Occupied Palestinian Territory: Commission boosts humanitarian funding by €7 million, retrieved 
at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1992andformat=HTMLandaged=0andlanguag
e=ENandguiLanguage=en. 
64.  See the list of beneficiaries and amount of funds here: www.ndc.ps/uploads/File/HRGGList.pdf and interview with 
Anna Klara Berglund, Programme Manager Human Rights, Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 
Jerusalem, 26 June 2009.
65.  Interview with Tanya Kelly, Temporary Humanitarian Officer (for Gaza), DfID, Jerusalem, 31 July 2009 and Mercy 
Corp website, www.mercycorps.org/countries/westbankgaza. 
4 4    P r ot e c t i n g  Pa l e s t i n i a n  c h i l d r e n  f r o m  P o l i t i c a l  V i o l e n c e
66.  Ridge 2009.
67.  The negative impact of the occupation upon the classroom is not a new phenomenon. For discussion of the situation 
in the mid-1990s following the first Intifada see Mansour 1996.
68.  UNDP 2009.
69.  Furthermore, families living in homes destroyed were not consulted given that the survey was conducted by landline 
telephone. 
70.  UNRWA and ECTAO (2009) http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/documents/eu_westbank/unrwa_en.pdf p.1.
71.  On its website, Save the Children US explains its protection-related activities in the oPt solely in terms of 
psychosocial activities as follows: ‘Save the Children is a lifeline for children at risk. Our groundbreaking psychosocial 
programs help children cope with stress and build the capacity of families and communities to support children’s 
psychosocial well-being. These initiatives also increase the capacity of local organizations to meet the needs of 
children and help create sustainable programs to promote their well-being.’ www.savethechildren.org/countries/
middle-east-eurasia/west-bank-and-gaza-strip.html, retrieved 11.6.10.
72.  We would draw attention to the efforts of certain mental and public health practitioners in the oPt, as in other non-
western locations such as Sri Lanka, to overcome the limitations of the dominant western-originating approach. In 
the oPt, the work of Rita Giacaman and colleagues at the Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University 
is notable in this regard. 
73.  For discussion of the need for a more collective approach to resilience-oriented initiatives with young Palestinians 
see Nguyen-Gillham et al. 2007.
74.  Hanafi and Tabar 2005: 62.
75.  Arab and Islamic donors offered the bulk of funding until the 1st Intifada and influenced the party-affiliated 
factionalisation civil society. See Challand 2009: 78–79 and Craissati 2005: 185–189.
76.  See Hanafi and Tabar 2005: .223–225.
77.  See Hart et al. 2011.
78.  Kruger and Steets 2010: 25 and 27.
79.  According to the UNICEF website ‘Human rights and child rights principles guide our work in all sectors – and at each 
stage of the process. These principles include: universality, non-discrimination, the best interests of the child, the 
right to survival and development, the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights, accountability and respect 
for the voice of the child.’ www.unicef.org/rightsresults/index.html, accessed 15.6.10.
80.  See Mearsheimer and Walt 2007.
81.  Interviewees also referred to the actions of SCUS in curtailing advocacy by fellow SC member organisations in 
respect of the impact of sanctions on Iraqi children in 2002, see Maguire 2003.
82.  Aaronson 2007: 8.
Case study 1
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1.  For more on al-Hadidiya see www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=2422 and http://
brightonpalestine.org/node/213.
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